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Case N'O. 7970 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the 1\'Iatter of the Estate of FLOR-
ENCE P. HOVV ARD, also kno,vn as F. P. 
HOWARD, Deceased, 
K.A.TIONAL TRUST CO~IP ANY, LTD., 
as Administrator with the Will Annexed of 
the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, De-
ceased, and COLIN_A __ FERRIE, 
Petitioners in Intervention and 
.A p·p-ellants, 
-vs.-
HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FOR-REST, 
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PRO.;-
TESTANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COM-
~fiSSIONERS and McGILL UNIVER-
SITY, MILDRED BLACK, HILDA 
BLACK, ROGER BLACK, R.ACHEL 
HELPS and WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah Banking corporation, 
Executor of the Estate- of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, 
Deceased, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
SEP 2 8 1953 
llW UGRlR1 
U. ot \l., 
ILED 
r~n ;~y· 14 1~·53 
~- ·- __ ..... - ... --... --................. -.WI! ............ ~ 
, ., :u~>· :~m~ Court~ L:~'P., 
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER & LAZIER, 
JOHN- D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J. 
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B. 
F;EIGHT, 
.Attorneys for Petitioners in Interven-
tion and .Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of FLOR- \ 
ENCE P. HOWARD, also known a.s F. P. 
HOWARD, Deceased, 
NATION.A.L TRUST COl\IP ANY, LTD., 
as Administrator "\Vith the Will Annexed of 
the Estate of R-obert Bown Ferrie, De-
ceased, and COLINA FERRIE, 
Petitioners in Intervention and 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST, Case No. 7970 
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PRO-
TESTANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COM-
. MISSIONERS and McGILL UNIVER-
SITY, MILDRED BLACK, HILDA 
BLACK, ROGER BLACK, _ R.ACHEL 
HELPS and WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah Banking corporation, 
Executor of the Estate of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F:. P. Howard, 
Deceased, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
ST·ATEMENT OF· F AC.TS 
Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, 
died in Montreal, Canada on the twenty-eighth day of 
January, 1952. 
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On the third day of .J._~pril, 1952, the Walker Bank & 
Trust Company, a Utah banking corporation, filed a 
Petition in the District Cou.rt of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of l"'"tah, 
entitled, "Petition for Probate of Will and Application 
for Commission to Take Testimony and Settle Inter-
rogatories" (Record, page 5). Said Petition set forth 
the names and residences of certain people designated 
as the heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, so far 
as then known to the Walker Bank & Trust Company 
(Record, page 6, 7 and 8). Not one of the people on said 
list was a resident of the State of Utah, and n1ost of then1 
were residents of the Dominion of Canada. Your Appel-
lants, herein, were not listed on said Petition in any 
manner and are among the nearest heirs of the said 
Florence P. Howard, also known as F·. P. Howard. 
That on the first day of May, 1952, the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company filed a "Supplemental Petition for Pro-
bate of Will" (Record, pages 26 to 30). Said Supple-
n1ental Petition allegedly set forth additional names and 
residences of certain heirs, legatees and devisees ( Rec-
ord, page 26), although the name of no additional per-
son was eontained in said Supplemental Petition . 
. 
No publication of the Petition or ·supplemental Peti-
tion for Probate of Will was n1ade in any paper, (Record 
page 25), and the notices given were, mailing of notices, 
but not to the Appellants, (Transcript, 294 to ~!)5 ), and 
three postings: One of \vhich w·as at the West entrance 
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of the City and County Building, in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (Transcript 274). The sec-
ond notice "\Yas in the Federal Post Office on \ .. ine Street 
in ~Iurray, lTtah, inunediately East of State Street 
(Transcript, 27-±). The third notice vvas on a bulletin 
board located immediately East of State Street on 33rd 
South Street in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Trans-
cript, 27±). Said bulletin board is a wooden board, ap-
proximately three and one-half feet vvide and appToxi-
mately five and one-half feet long, standing on two 
wooden supports, approxilnately t"\vo inches by four 
inches in size (Transcript 275), and said board is not il-
luminated and is not designated as a public posting board, 
nor has it any sign on it stating that it is a public posting 
board (Transcript, 281). It is merely a flat board upon· 
vlhich the notices are placed by means of thumb tacks or 
tacks (Transcript 282), and said board is located between 
the North sidewalk of 33rd South Street and the North 
boundary of the vehicular travelled portion of 33rd South 
Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, (Transcript, 
275). The notices were placed on that part of the board 
facing the vehicular travelled portion of said street, and 
the rear of the board being to said sidewalk. Papers, so 
posted, cannot be seen from the sidewalk to the North 
of the board (Transcript, 276). Water and splashings 
from the travel, of course, get upon said posted notices 
(Transcript 275 and 282). Immediately to the rear of 
said board and North of said sidewalk is a lot containing 
trees and lawn and a building known as the South Salt 
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4: 
Lake Stake Tabernacle is to the East and North of said 
board. Said hoard is not enclosed in any building (Trans-
cript, 271 to 287) . 
On the fourteenth day of May, 1952, based upon such 
posting, and without any notice having been mailed to 
these Appellants (Transcript, 294), four holographic 
instruments were admitted to pTohate as the last "\Vill and 
Testament of said :B,lorence P. Howard, also known as 
F. P. Howard, deceased (Record, page 33), and the 
Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed Executor 
of the Estate of said decedent (Record, page 35). 
Subsequent to the admission of the instruments to 
probate, the Walker Bank & Trust Con1pany, realizing 
, that it had listed in its Petition, aln1ost entirely persons 
listed as friends and knowing there were heirs whose 
names had not been set forth on the Petition for Probate, 
and having determined that decedent had relatives other 
than those who were listed in the Petetion for Probate 
of Will, petitioned the Court for an Order (Record, pages 
53 to 55), which was granted (Record page 52), on the 
third day of September, 1952, directing the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company to notify the additionally discovered 
heirs that said documents had been admitted to probate 
as the last Will and Testament of decedent. That your 
Appellant, National Trust Co1npany, Ltd. \vas not in-
cluded in the list of names to whom notice 'vas given on 
the said third day of Septernber, 1952, although in .August 
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of 1952, the said \\Talker Bank & Trust Company had 
written to the National Trust Company, Ltd. and Colina 
Ferrie (Record, page 51). 
On the twelfth day of N oven1ber, 1952, Helen Duys, 
Ernest F. Howard and Ethel Forrest filed a Contest of 
Order Admitting \'Vilis to Probate (Record, pag_e 131). 
No notice of said Contest was served upon either of the 
Appellants herein (Record, pages 129, 130, 135 and 136), 
although Colina Ferrie was then an heir of record. 
On or about the sixth day of December, 1952~ Hilda, 
~iildred and Roger Black and Rachel Helps, filed an 
Ans\Yer to said Contest (Record, page 62). 
On the sixteenth day of December, 1952, the McGill 
University and the Protestant Board of School Commis-
sioners of Montreal, each filed Answers to said Contest 
(Record, pages 64 and 66), and Walker Bank & Trust 
Company also filed an Answer to said Contest (Record, 
page 119)~ 
On the fifteenth day of November, 1952, the Walker 
Bank & Trust Company filed a "Petition to Construe 
Will" (Record, page 74). That the Petition to Construe 
Will and the Contest of Will, were consolidated for hear-
Ing. 
On the fourteenth day of January, 19·53, Appellants 
herein, filed a Motion to Intervene in the said Will Con-
test and asked permission to file the attached Answer and 
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Cross-Complaint in Intervention (Record, page 141). 
On the same date, they filed their position and Answer 
in the Petition to construe the Will (Record, page 162). 
On the nineteenth day of January, 1953, the Motion 
to Intervene was heard in said District Court and the 
Honorable Judge thereof, denied Appellants' right to in-
tervene in said Will Contest (Record, page 196). 
After denying Appellants right to intervene in the 
Will Contest, the Court heard arguments in relation to 
the construction of the four holographic instruments 
which had been admitted as a Will, and on February 10, 
1953, Ordered, "That the four instruments in the Ex-
ecutor's Petition to Construe the Will are declared to be 
the last Will and Testament of the deceased, Florence P. 
Howard, and. that all four Wills are valid and constitute 
the Will of said deceased and should be administered as a 
whole, except insofar as they are irreconcilable as to par-
ticular bequests, and each should be given effect insofar 
as possible." (Record 198). Thereafter, and after this 
Intermediate Appeal was granted by your Honorable 
Court, the Attorn~ys for Helen Duys, Ernest F. Howard 
and Ethel F'Orrest prepared, and on March 22, 1953, 
asked the Court to sign, Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree in the Will Contest, wherein it 
was stated that the Appellants herein were represented 
in said action and ignored the Order, theretofore signed 
by the Court, on February 5, 1953, denying leave to inter-
vene, and said Findings, Conclusions and Decree pur-
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ported to dismiss the Cross-Co1nplaint in Intervention, 
although Appellants were not permitted by the Court to 
file it or to support it by evidence or law, (Record, page 
2±7 to 249). 
STATEnlENT 013, POINTS 
POINT NO. I. 
THAT THE POSTING OF NOTICES IN THE ESTATE OF 
FLORENCE P. HOWARD, ALSO KNOWN AS F. P. 'HOWARD, 
DECEASED, DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY 
OR CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THERE-
FORE, THE ENTIRE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS ARE A 
NULLITY. 
A. THE POSTINGS WERE NOT IN THREE PUBLIC 
PLACES, AS DEFINED BY STATUTE. 
B. THE NOTICES, AS GIVEN, WERE NOT CALCU-
LATED TO IMPART KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRO-
BATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE HEIRS, DEVISEES 
AND LEGATEES. 
C. NO NOTICE WAS MAILED TO THE HEIRS OR TO 
APPELLANTS. 
POINT NO. II. 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND 
THE COURT HAD NO DISCRETION IN THE MATTER. 
POINT NO. III. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION HAD NOT RUN ON INTER-
VENTION. 
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POINT NO. IV. 
APPELLANTS HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BE-
LIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF PERMITTED TO 
INTERVENE. 
POINT NO. V. 
SINCE THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS WERE DE-
NIED INTERVENTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
MADE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT AS 
THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL AND 
VvERE PARTIES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED 
TO BIND THEM BY SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF, LAW AND DECREE, AS SIGNED IN THE 
PURPORTED WILL CONTEST. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THAT THE POSTING OF NOTICES IN THE ESTATE OF 
FLORENCE P. HOWARD, ALSO KNOWN AS F. P. HOWARD, 
DECEASED, DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY 
OR CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THERE-
FORE, THE ENTIRE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS ARE A 
NULLITY. 
A. THE POSTINGS WERE NOT IN THREE PUBLIC 
PLACES, AS DEFINED BY STATUTE. 
B. THE NOTICES, AS GIVEN, WERE NOT CALCU-
LATED TO IMPART KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRO-
BATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE HEIRS, DEVISEES 
AND LEGATEES. 
C. NO NOTICE WAS MAILED TO THE HEIRS OR TO 
APPELLANTS. 
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Proper notice of the Petition to admit 'vills to pro-
bate must be given to all heirs, devisees and legatees of 
the decedent, or the proceedings of the Court are void. 
In fVells v. J( elley, 11 U. -±21, 40 P. 705, the Court 
stated: 
"The law is too well settled to require refer-
ences to authorities that where jurisdiction de-
pends on the publication of a notice, and the trial 
of the cause is proceeded with before such pub""' 
lication is complete, the C-ourt acts without juris-
diction and its orders are void." 
Section 75-3-5, lT tah Code Annotated, 1953, provides : 
"Notice and Hearing-' When the Petition is 
filed it must be set for hearing, notice of which 
shall be given by publication or by posting as the 
court or clerk may direct and by the 1nailing of 
notices to the heirs, and to the executor, if he is 
not the petitioner." 
The Court may order either publication or posting, 
but the mailing to the heirs is mandatory. 
It will be noted that the Court limited the Clerk in 
the mailing of notices to certain named persons (Record, 
page 25), so that the Clerk could not and was not per-
mitted to use independent judgment or to mail notices 
to any heirs whom he might find. He wa;s limited to the 
"heirs, legatees and devisees * * $ who are listed and 
whose addresses are shown in the Schedule attached to 
the Supplemental Petition for Probate of Will." Such 
limitation upon the mailing of notices to the heirs is 
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10 
contrary to the statute above quoted and is an abuse of 
the court of its power, particularly when such notices 
are jurisdictional. Neither the- Judge, nor the Clerk 1nay 
1nake a valid order setting aside the jurisdictional re-
quireinents in such a case. 
In re Bunting's Estate, 30 U. 251, 84 P. 109, no 
:notice was mailed to the heirs at law. The Supreme 
Court held that the lower Court had acted in excess of its 
jurisdiction and set aside the probate proceedings. It 
stated: 
''The purpose of the law in requiring notice to 
be given of the time and place of hearing petitions 
for letters of administration is to advise those 
\Vho are interested in the proceedings and give 
them an opportunity to be present, and, if they so 
desire, make objections to the issuance of letters 
to the party petitioning therefor. * * *" 
'~Therefore, because Guheen may not haYe 
had actual, positive knowledge at the very n1on1ent 
of filing his petition, of the place of residence of 
the heirs, all of whon1 were minors at the tiine 
Bunting died, and all, except one, at the time the 
petition was filed, did not dispense with the neces-
sity of mailing notices to them as required hy 
Sec. 3818, R.evised Statutes, 1898, of the place and 
time of the hearing on the petition at Blackfoot, 
Idaho, the place where Bunting resided at the ti1ne 
of his death, and which was known to Guheen 
\Vhen he filed his petition." 
The Court, in the above case, quoted with approval, 
2 Abbott's Probate Lau}, Sec. 853, wherein it "Tas stated: 
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. "All jurisdiction of persons or property de-
pends upon notice. It is the one fundamental and 
indispensable foundation for 'due process of law', 
and it Inay be said, as a rule without exception, 
that no judicial action whatsoever, is valid or 
binding 'vithout son1e notice, actual or construc-
tive. It is likevvise funda1nental that the require-
ments for giving notice must be strictly -complied 
with, and this rule applies with increased force to 
'vhat are termed 'special proceedings'. Proceed-
ings in probate belong to this class." 
Most of the names set forth in the Petition and Sup-
plemental Petition of Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
for probate of the will, were listed as friends. Walker 
Bank & Trust Co1npany, by its "Supplemental Petition 
to Probate", at least implied to the Court that additional 
heirs, legatees and devisees had been found, but the sai9-
Supplemental Petition contains the name of not a single 
additional person. Later on, as shown by the Affidavit 
of Walker Bank & Trust Company (Record, page 168-
169), the bank determined from Rosamond Lamb that 
many additional persons were heirs of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased. This de-
termination was apparently made well after the instru-
ments had been admitted to probate and after the time 
of the jurisdictional notices. It will be noted that Walker 
Bank & Trust Company was well acquainted with Rosa-
mond Lamb. Rosamond Lamb had picked up the old 
wills from the bank and had taken Mrs. H·oward to Mont-
real with her. Mrs. Howard died while visiting with 
Rosamond Lamb and in a hospital in Montreal where the 
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said Rosamond Lamb lived. Rosamond Lamb had, after 
the death of Mrs. Howard, filed a request to have a Five 
Thousand Dollar ( $5,000.00) check, issued by l\frs. 
Howard prior to her death, honored and paid (Record, 
page 44), and the said Rosamond Lamb was one of those 
who the bank knew to be associated with the affairs of 
Mrs. Ho,vard. This should have caused Walker Bank & 
Trust Company to inquire of Miss Lamb, one of the very 
close friends of Mrs. Howard, as to who were the heirs 
of Mrs .. Howard. If the bank had so inquired, the nan1es 
of the people listed in the Affidavit of the bank, 'vould 
have been known to the bank prior to the Petition and 
prior to the Supplemental Petition for Probate of \Viii, 
and the jurisdictional requirements of 1nailing could have 
been met. 
In the case of Ba.rrett v. Whitney, 36 U. 574, 106 P. 
522, cited with approval in the Bunting case, the Court 
said: 
"Section 4026 provides the time for which no-
tice must be given, and this court, in a direct pro-
ceedings, (in re Bunting's Estate, 30 U. 251, SJ 
P. 109), held that, unless the notice is given for 
the time and in the manner provided in said See-
tion, the court acquires no jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings." 
The case further implies that the court must be fully 
advised of all the premises, including names of all heirs, 
or if there may be unknown heirs, or heirs \vith unkno"rn 
addresses, that fact 1nust be set forth. The court stated: 
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"The heirs Inay be ntunerous, and may live in 
different parts of this, or even in so1ne other 
Country. \Vhen their na1nes and places of resi-
dence are thus given, or 'vhen the fact is n1ade to 
appear that they are tmkno-w~n, as i.t must be 
(emphasis added) in the position for the letters of 
administration, the probate court is fully advised 
'vith respect to the true situation. While the court 
may assun1e that, as a matter of lav{, and for the 
purpose of jurisdiction, both the known and un-
known heirs are before the court, yet, whether the 
heirs are living in different states, or otherwise, 
it cannot be presumed that a prudent and careful 
Judge would ordinarily proceed to distribute, 
without notice to the heirs, or to some a.ccredi ted · 
person representing them." 
In the case at Bar, it is obvious that none of the 
heirs were residents of the State of Utah. That most 
of the heirs, devisees and legatees were residents of the 
Dominion of Canada, and a "prudent and careful Judge 
would ordinarily proceed" to have notices published in 
the Dominion of Canada, or at some other place calcu-
lated to come to the attention of the unknown heirs of 
Florence P. Howard, also known as F·. P. Howard, de-
ceased, that a will was to be admitted to probate. Note, 
that the publication of notice to creditors was had in the 
South Salt Lake Herald (Record, page 35A and 38). Did 
the Walker Bank & Trust Company have full realization 
of its duty to give the kind of notice calculated to come to 
the attention of the heirs or creditors of a person from 
Canada, who was in Canada when she died~ 
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In re Phillips' Estate, 86 U. 358, 44 P. 2d 699, the 
court discussed the question of whether proper notice 
was given to convey jurisdiction, and in so doing, stated: 
"The law did not intend that a n1ere obeisance 
should be done to the obligation of providing the 
world with notice when jurisdiction itself depend-
ed upon such notice. The notice is highly substan-
tive and not conventional; it is intended not only 
to give notice to parties interested, but to raise 
a notoriety which through the common concourse 
of mankind .might reach persons interested. At a 
time it was doubted by thoughtful members of the 
bar whether posting would stand the test of due 
process. The best that posting can do toward giv-
ing- notice is none too good. Certainly, concentrat-
ing the three postings in a limited area 'vhere 
they simply duplicated the effect of one is insuffi-
cient. It does not give the notoriety which in the 
end may reach interested parties. It does not 1neet 
the requirements of the statute. Not an answer is 
to say that in all probability persons in Boston 
would. not have had communicated to them directly 
or indirectly notice of the pending probate pro-
ceedings, even though the notices were posted 
widely over the county." 
In the case at Bar, nothing was done, "to raise notor-
iety, through which the common concourse of mankind 
might reach persons interested." The Petitioner for 
Letters Testamentary knew that Mrs. Florence P. How-
ard carne originally from Canada, was born and grew to 
young womanhood in that Dominion, and that her frunily, 
insofar as they had knowledge of then1, continued to re-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
side in Canada. I-Iowever, it did nothing, nor did it at-
tempt to do anything, to cause any notoriety in the 
Dominion of Canada, 'vhich n1ight co1ne to the attention 
of any of the heirs of ~Irs. Florence P. Howard, also 
known as F. P. Howard. 
In re Phillips' Estate, the court further stated: 
'~That the mere negative finding that the post-
ing in this case is not sufficient, is of little guide 
to the persons whose duty it is to post notices. 
Ori the other hand, an affirmative rule, of what is 
sufficient, depends so much upon the situation in 
every county, and perhaps the situation in the 
cases themselves, that hard and fast rules cannot 
be enunciated. * * * There should be customary 
places at which all notices should be posted, which 
places should be at conspicuously public points 
and not on the by-ways. * * *" 
"The proof of posting, contained in the pro-
bate files, reveals the posting to have been at the· 
vVest entrance of the City and County Building, 
on University Avenue, and on Center Street. We 
cannot take judicial notice that these streets are 
in Provo, or that they are actually within 80 yards 
of each other. We are confined to the facts set 
out in the petition to set aside for that informa-
tion." 
In the case at Bar, the testimony sho,vs that all no-
tices were posted immediately adjacent to the East of 
8tate Street, as it runs through Salt Lake County 
(Transcript, 280). The notice posted in the Post Office 
at Murray, was posted on Flederal property, and within 
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the jurisdiction of the United States. The notice posted 
on 33rd South Street was not such a notice as would give 
notoriety to the pending action. The paper upon which 
the notice was written, could not be seen by people walk-
ing along the sidewalk, and could be seen only by cars 
driving West, or parked on the No-rth side of 33rd South 
Street (Transcript, 276). The notice, itself, could not be 
read from such cars, nor could it be read by people along 
the sidewalk on 33rd South Street. The only possibility 
for reading the same, would be on foot, between the 
"bulletin board" and the vehicular travelled portion of 
33rd South Street. The testimony further shows that the 
"bulletin board" was situated in such a position that it 
\vas a common occurrence for 1nuddy water to be splashed 
thereon and to obliterate the notices posted thereon 
(Transcript, 282.). As a practical matter, the only 'vay 
such a notice would be seen, would be for a person to 
make a special trip for that particular purpose and to 
walk around behind the "bulletin board" and to read 
therefrom. 
We further desire to call the Court's attention to 
the fact that no notice was mailed to the Appellants here-
in (Section 75-4-8, and Section 75-3-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953), on the Petition or Supplemental Petition 
to Probate the Will, and the sole and only basi~ upon 
which it might be claimed that notice was given to the1n 
was the posting heretofore discussed, which does not n1eet 
the require1nents of the constitutional provision of due 
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process of la-\v, and is not that type of notice calculated 
'~to raise a noto1:iety \vhich, through the con1n1on con-
course of n1ankind reach persons interested." 
The following citations, cover certain cases in which 
the posting of notices have been held insufficient because 
of the place where posted. 
JJ!Iyreck v. Ka.hle, 120 Wis. 57, 97 NvV 506; 
Ti.dd v. Smith, 3 N.H. 178, 2 ALR 1013; 
Roach v. E~~gene, 23 Ore. 376, 31 P. 825. 
See also the discussions in 2 ALR 1008, 39 
Am. Jur., page 251 and 46 C.J. 560. 
It \vill be noted that in the instant case, no notice of 
the Petition, or Supplemental Petition to Probate the 
Will was ever mailed to any of the Appellants. 
21 Am. Ju.r., page 435, states: 
"vVhere a requirement of notice is juris-
dictional, unless the notice is given for the time 
and in the manner provided, the court acquires no 
jurisdiction of the probate." 
Citing: 
Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Comp·any, 
54 U. 181, 182 P. 189, 9 ALR 1119; 
Barrett v. Whitney, 36 U. 574, 106 P. 522, 37 
LRA (NS-) 368. 
The Utah Statutes on the subject are as follows: 
Section 75-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads: 
"When the petition is filed, it must be set for 
hearing, notice of which shall be given by publica-
tion or by posting as the court or clerk may direct, 
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and by mailing of notices to the heirs, and to the 
executor if he is not the petitioner." (Emphasis 
added). 
Section 75-4-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads: 
"When a petition praying for letters of ad-
ministration is filed, the court or clerk must set 
the petition for hearing and give notice thereof 
by publication, or by posting and by mailing no-
tices to the heirs." (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, there 'vas no publication of no-
tice and no 1nailing to the Appellants herein. The only 
possible nQtice given to them was that given by the so-
called posting. 
In re Bunting's Estate, Supra, holds that the notice 
provided for in the above Sections of the Statutes must 
be mailed to the heirs. 
POINT NO. II. 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AND 
THE COURT HAD NO DISCRETION IN THE MATTER. 
The Appellants herein feel that the entire proceed-
ings of the lower Court in the Estate of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased, are a 
nullity. However, they desire to present the argu1nents 
on the next four points to your Honorable Court, in the 
event that your Honorable Body decides the first point 
contrary to their position. 
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Appellants' l\fotion to Interyene '""as not discretion-
ary ""ith the Court, but the right is given by Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Utah cases. \.T olun1e 9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, gives Rule 2-1- of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, "\Yhich states: 
(a) Intervention as a Inatter of right. "Upon 
timely application anyone shall be_ permitted 
to intervene in an action: ( 1) when a statute 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the representation of the appli-
cant's interest by existing parties is or may 
be inadequate and the applicant is or may 
be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) 
when the applicant is so situated as to be ad-
versely affected by a distribution or other dis-
position of property which is the custody or 
subject to the control or disposition of the 
court or an officer thereof." 
This Application for Intervention was filed prior 
to the time the case \Vas called for trial and was heard 
prior thereto. In the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73 U. 
357, 274 P. 136, the Utah Supreme Court held, the person 
who asked leave to intervene on the day of the trial had 
made timely application for intervention and she was 
permitted to intervene in such case. 
Appellants were entitled to intervene under each 
of the subheadings of the Rule. The first sub-heading 
which states, they are permitted to intervene "when a 
statute confers an unconditional right to intervene", is 
covered by Section 75-14-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which Section states: 
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"Any person shall have a right to be heard by 
the court at any hearing on any question affecting 
a probate or guardianship matter in which he is 
interested." 
In the case at Bar, the Appellants herein are vitally 
interested in the Will Contest, and the Statute, above 
quoted, gave them the right, unconditionally, to be heard 
in the matter. 
The second point under the Rule provides them un-
conditional right to intervene, "'vhen the representation 
of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or 1nay 
be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by 
a judgment in the action".. There is no question in tl1e 
instant case, but tha.t the representation of Appellants' 
interest wa.s inadequate. This matter is conclusively 
shown by the fact that all parties to the action, including 
the Executor, Walker Bank & Trust Company, resisted 
the intervention and resisted the right of Appellants to 
be heard, and the Stipulation between some of the parties 
(Recora, page 178 to 182), and the payment of the Clain1 
of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) by the Executor to 
Rosamond Lamb. No one who was in the case, repre-
sented Appellants' interest in any degree. 
The third point, that "when the applicant is so situ-
ated a.s to be adversely affected by a distribution or other 
disposition of property \vhich is in the custody or subject 
to the control or disposition of the court" has direct ap-
plication in the instant case. Appellants are so1ne of the 
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heirs at la'v of Florence P. Ho,vard, also known as F. P. 
Howard, and they are so situated as to be adversely af-
fected by the distribution of the estate of Florence P. 
Howard, also kno'vn as F. P. Howard, deceased. This 
Estate is in the custody and subject to the control and 
disposition of the Court. 
We submit, that in the instant case, the Utah Rule 
is peculiarly applicable to Appellants, and their Motion 
to Interyene should have been granted as a n1atter of 
right, pursuant to such Rule, and that the lower Court 
had no discretion to deny such ~.Iotion. 
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, page 1139, 
states: 
"The conditions prerequisite to the exercise 
of the right of intervention, depend largely, of 
course, upon the wording of the Statute under 
which ~he right is asserted. However, it may be 
broadly stated that when the applicant is not an 
indispensable party, intervention will not, as a 
rule, be allowed, when it will retard the principle 
suit, or will require a reopening of the case, or de-
lay the trial, or change the position of the original 
parties, or "\Vill change the form of the action or 
the issues. But it is to be born in, mind, that it 
would be practically in1possible for one to inter-
vene in an action without presenting a question 
of fact not involved in the pleadings of the origin-
al parties, and if this were inhibited, then the 
Code provision on the subject of intervention, 
would be of no avail. The question, therefore, 
whether or not, a new issue of fact is presented by 
a Petition for Intervention, is not the test to apply 
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in determining whether an issue, different from 
that between the original parties will be made 
by the intervenor; it is sufficient that the ultimate 
issue to be determined, remains the same." 
In the instant case, the ultimate issue to be deter-
lnined is to whom some or all of the property of ~Irs. 
Florence P. Howard, also known as F'. P. Howard, should 
be distributed. That 'vas the ultimate. question in the 
Contest, as filed, and that is the ultimate issue raised 
by the Motion to Intervene. 
In the case of Houston Real Estate Investment Con~­
pany v. Hechler, 44 U. 64, 138 P. 1159, at page 1162, this 
Honorable Court stated: 
"As we understand the purpose of the Stat-
ute relating to intervention, it is not intended to 
be implied only where a third person may have 
such an interest in the subject of the action which 
makes him an indispensable party; but the Statute 
applies where such third person, at some stage of 
the proceedings before trial is shown to have an 
interest which would make him a proper party." 
We submit, in the instant case, that the Appellants 
had such an interest as would make them proper parties. 
The determination of the Will Contest will, to a large 
extent, declare who will receive the bulk of the Estate of 
Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, de-
ceased~ 
In the case of Cache Lapoudre Irrigating Co1npa·ny 
v. Hally, 43 Colo. 32, 95 P. 317, the Supreme Court of 
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Colorado, in discussing the questions raised by interven-
tion, stated: 
Hit would be practically iinpossible for one to 
intervene in an action "\Yithout presenting a ques-
tion of fact not involved in the p~leadings of the 
original parties, and if this was inhibited, then our 
Code provision on the subject of intervention 
would be of no avail. The question of whether or 
not a new issue of fact is presented by a petition 
of intervention is not the test to apply under a 
Code provision as broad as ours, in determining 
'vhether an issue different from that between 
the original parties will be made by the inter-
venor. * * * True the intervenor pleaded facts 
upon which it predicated a right to the subject-
matter of controversy which are not stated in the 
original pleadings, and which, if established, 
would prevent the judgment which the plaintiffs 
seek, but that has not changed the original issue. 
It still remains as it was, i.e., are or are not the 
plaintiffs entitled to divert the water from the 
stream which they claim~ In other words, al-
though intervenor predicates its right to the sub-
ject-matter of controversy upon which it relies for 
a judgment in its favor, and to defeat a recovery 
in favor of plaintiffs upon facts not stated in 
either of the pleadings of the original parties, yet 
the ultimate issue to be determined, the right to 
divert water from the stream, remains the same, 
and this appears to be the general rule by which 
to determine whether or not the intervenor has 
injected a new issue into the case in which he is 
allowed to intervene." 
In the instant case, the ultimate question involved, 
is to who1n should the property of Florence P. Howard, 
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also known as .. F. P. Howard, deceased, be distributed. 
The Answer and Cross-Complaint of Appellants, raises 
the same ultimate question, to~ wit: To whom should the 
property of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. 
Howard, deceased, be distributed. No new ultimate issue 
need be determined. 
McGill University and the Protestant Board of 
School Commissioners of Montreal, prayed in their An-
swers, that all four instruments together constitute the 
last Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also 
known as F. P. Howard, deceased. This, of necessity, 
raises the negative, that none of the instruments con-
stitute the last Will and Testament of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F·. P. How~rd, deceased, and that 
is one of the positions taken by Appellants in their An-
swer and Cross-Complaint. It is thus obvious, that not 
only is the ultimat~ issue, as raised by the Appellants, 
the same, but the fact situation to be determined is identi-
cal with that raised by McGill University and the Pro-
testant Board of ·sehool Commissioners, to-wit: Do, or do 
not, the four instruments constitute the last Will and 
Testament of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. 
Howard, deceased~ 
The Answer of Mildred Black raises that issue and 
the issue of the revocation of the for1ner wills by the ,vill 
·dated January 14, 1952. 
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POINT NO. III. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION HAD NOT RUN ON INTER-
VENTION. 
In the instant case, a Will Contest was filed in due 
time, by Helen Duys, Ernest F. Howard and Ethel Fnr-
rest, in which they claimed that the first two instruments 
were revoked by the instrument dated May 7, 1949, and 
that the instrument dated January 14, 1952 was a Codicil 
to the 1949 instrument (Record, page 131). 
On the sixth day of December, 1952, Mildred Black, 
for and on behalf of herself and her brother and sisters, 
Hilda Black, Roger Black and Rachel Helps, filed an An-
swer to said Will Contest; and in said Answer, Mildred 
Black claimed that the said instrument of January 14, 
1952 was intended by Florence P. Howard, also known 
as F. P. Howard, to be her sole will, to the exclusion of 
all other documents (Record, page 62). 
On the sixteenth day of December, 1952, McGill Uni-
versity and the Protestant Board of School Commission-
ers of ~Iontreal, each filed Answers in said Will Contest, 
wherein each alleged that the four holographic instru-
ments constituted the last Will and Testament of said 
decedent (Record, pages 64 and 66). 
On January 14, 1953, Appellants herein, filed a Mo-
tion to Intervene in said Will Contest and attached to 
said Motion their Answ~r and Cross-C.omplaint in Inte-r-
vention, which alleged that none of the documents was 
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the last Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also 
known as F. P. Howard, deceased, but that if any of then1 
were, it was the last document \Yritten and executed and 
dated January 14, 19·52, by the said Florence P. I-Io"rard, 
also known as F. P. Howard, deceased (Record, page 
141). This latter position is identical to the position 
taken by Mildred Black, Hilda Black, Roger Black and 
Rachel Helps (Record, page 62). 
In their Answer and Cross-Co1nplaint in Interven-
tion, Appellap.ts further raised the jurisdictional facts 
discussed under Point I, supra, which had not been 
raised by any of the otheT parties. 
On the nineteenth day of January, 1953, the ~fotion 
to Intervene was heard by the said District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, and the Honorable Judge thereof, 
on January 19, 1953, orally denied Appellants right to 
intervene in said Will Contest, and later, to--wit: On the 
fifth day of February, 1953, signed a written Order, deny-
ing Appellants' Motion to Intervene (Record, page 196). 
The position of the Appellants is that the filing of 
the Contest of Wills tolled the six months statute of liinit-
ations, so that it did not apply as to anybody. 
1 Ba;n.croft Probate Practice, Second Edition, page 
410, states: 
"But once the jurisdiction of the Court, to 
deter1nine the validity of a will attaches hY the 
timely filing of a contest, the court does not lose 
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jurisdiction thereon until disposition has been 
1nade of the matter, or stating it in another way, 
the order admitting the will to probate does not 
become final within that period authorized by the 
particular state for eontest, if a contes,t is filed." 
See Voyce v. Superior Court (Calif.) 127 P. 
2d 536; 
Pecks' Esta.te, 153 Wash. 687, 280 P. 87. 
In any event, Appellants should have been permitted 
to intervene to the extent of the issues already raised 
in the Will Contest by the Answer of Mildred Black, Hilda 
Black, Roger Black and Rachel Helps, to-wit: That the 
instrument dated January 14, 1952, constituted the last 
Will and Testament of Florence P. Howard, also known 
as F. P. Howard, deceased, to the exclusion of the other 
instruments. 
There are many cases which hold, and it is almost 
universally accepted that a Will Contest filed within the 
statutory time inures to the benefit of any interested 
party intervening after such time, and the Statute of 
Limitations is no defense to his petition in intervention. 
See Bu.tzow's Estate, (Cal.), 68 P. 2d 374, wheTein 
it is stated: 
"The question does not appear to have been 
decided in this state; and it appears from deci-
sions from other jurisdictions that a contest filed 
within the statutory time inures to the benefit 
of an interested party to intervene after the statu-
tory period, and that the statute of limitations 
is not a defense to such a petition. (Citing cases)~ 
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In illinoi~, however, the contrary was held. Brain-
ley v. Bromley, Ill., 191 NE 268, 93 ALR 1041. 
As between the two lines of decisions, we prefer 
to follow that which seems to be the more liberal 
rule declared by the Kansas and Ohio courts.'' 
In Weichold v. Day, (Okla.), 236 P., p·age 649, the 
court stated: 
"This court has held that, where an action to 
set aside a will is properly brought by a bona fide 
litigant who is not barred by the Statute of Liinit-
ations from maintaining it, such action inures to 
the benefit of all others concerned who intervene 
in the action, although they themselves 'vould be 
barred by the Statute of Limitations fron1 insti-
tuting it." (Citing cases.) 
The court cited with approval: 
Pow-ell v. Koehler, 52 Ohio 102, 39 NE 195, 
26 LR.A 480, 49 Am. State Reports 705 to 
the same effect. 
Section 75-14·-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
"Any person shall have a right to be heard by 
the court at any hearing on any question effect-
ing a probate or guardianship matter in which he 
is interested." 
On the authority of this ·statute, the Court should 
have permitted the Appellants to intervene in said Will 
Contest. Certainly, the Appellants should have heen per-
mitted to intervene to the extent of the issues raif'ed by 
the pleading of Mildred Black, Hilda Black, R.oger Blaek 
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and Rachel Help·s, and McGill University and the Pro-
testant Board of School Commissioners of Montreal, 
and \~V alker Bank & Trust Company. 
See Maurier v. Miller, 77 Kan. 92, 93 P. 596, 
8 ALR 2nd 111. 
POINT NO. IV. 
APPELLANTS HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BE-
LIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF PERMITTED TO 
INTERVENE. 
Appellants should have been granted leave to inter-
vene, and after intervention should have been allowed 
to introduce evidence and the Court should have heard 
evidence conce~ning the surrounding circun1s.tances of 
the execution of the wills, exclusive of her oral declara-
tions, and should have granted to Ap·pellants a trial of the 
issues before a jury, if asked for. 
Section 74-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Appellants not only should have been granted leave 
to intervene, but had a more than reasonably fair chance 
of having their position sustained on a Will Contest, 
namely that·none of the instruments constituted the last 
will of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, 
deceased, or if any instrument be her will, it is the in-
strument dated Jan. 14, 1952. While there is a presump-
tion in some states that the will of a person should be 
construed so as to prevent partial intestacy, the Utah 
Statute says, that it should be construed so as to prevent 
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total intestacy. The blood heirs of the testator n1ay not be 
cut off without clear and unequivocal language, (In re 
Clark's Estate (Cal.) 149 P. 2d 465, 57 Am. Jur. 757, and 
cases cited there). The interpretation propounded by 
the Respondents herein, would completely cut off the 
blood heirs of Florence P. Howard, also known as F. P. 
Howard, deceased. In addition, there is a series of cases 
which hold that a later will not disposing of the residue, 
revokes an earlier will which does dispose of the residue. 
See Plenty v. West, 6 C.B: 201, 16 Beg. 173, 
51 Eng. Rep. 743; 
In re Estate of Bryan, 1907 Prob. 125, 6 
B.R.C·. 25; 
In re Estate of Fawcett, 1941 Pro b. 86; 
I 
See also the annotation following Esta.te of 
Bryan, at 6 B.R.C. 25; 
In re Wupperman's Estate, 300 N. Y. Supp. 
344; 
In re Bjor's Estate (Cal.) 229 P. 2nd 468. 
In 28 ALR 2nd 535, 546, the annotator cites In re 
Marx's E.state, 174 C·al. 762, 164 P. 640 (the case cited 
below by respondents as contra to appellants position) as 
turning on the theory of "dependent relative revocation". 
In the instant case no such theory is involved. In 2R 
ALR 2nd 554 and 555, there is a discussion of 1nany 
cases holding contrary to In re Marx, especially good i~ 
the discussion of In re Wupperman, 300 N.Y. Supp. 2-t-4, 
as is contained on page 552. 
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The primary rule for the construction of a will is to 
ascertain the testator's intention. In the instant case, 
several bequests of specific personal property were 
changed from \viii to will. 
The manner in \vhich the testatrix changed the ob-
jects of her bounty concerning certain bequests, should 
have caused the court to have allowed intervention and 
testimony, and in view of the cases cited herein, should 
have persuaded the court that the inte-nt of Florence P. 
Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, deceased, was to 
make a final will on January 14, 1952, which was so in-
consistent with the former instruments, as to result legal-
ly in their revocation. Illustrative of this, is the disposi-
tion of various personal items : 
SILVER TOILET SET: 
Given to Marie Petry in instrument ap~pended to 
holographic will, dated June 3, 1940. 
Given to Miss Mildred Black in instrument dated 
May 7~ 1949. 
Given to Rosamond Lamb and Mary Stuart Tin-
ling in the instrument dated January 14, 1952, along 
with other personal effects, which were not specific 
bequests. Marie Petry is given $5,000.00 and some 
little thing, in the 1952 instrument, and Miss Mildre'd 
Black is given $2,500.00 and a diamond watch in 
the same instrument. 
SOLITAIRE DIANIOND RING: 
Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated 
June 3, 1940. 
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Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated 
May 7, 1949, and also $3,000.00. 
Given to Isobel Budden in the instrument dated 
January 14, 1952. 
OL·D SILVER TEAPOT: 
Given to Ernest F. Howard in the instrmnent dated 
June 3, 1940. He is also given a portion of the resi-
due. 
Given to Ernest F. Howard, (address from ~Irs. H. 
M. Duys, ~1ontclaire) in the instrmnent dated ]_\Jfay 
7, 19·49. 
Given to R-osamond Lamb and Mary Stuart Tinling 
in the instrument dated January 14, 1952, along 
with other personal effects, which were not specific 
bequests, and Ernest F. Howard was given a por-
trait of his grandfather. 
DIAMOND AND EMERALD RING: 
Given to Mrs. H. I-I. Lamb, ("or if she predecease 
n1e to her daughter, Rosamond") in the instrun1ent 
dated June 3, 1940, and also $1,000.00. 
Given to Rosan1ond Lamb in the instrument dated 
May 7, 1949, and also $2,000.00. 
Given to Rosamond Lamb in the instrun1ent dated 
January 14, 1~52, together with $50,000.00 and one-
half of balanee of personal effects. 
DIAMOND WIDE BROOCH: 
Given to Mrs. C. P. Howard, in the 1940 instrmnent, 
and described as being a circular dia1nond brooch. 
In the instrument dated F·ebruary 6, l 939, onP Cavie 
I>. I-Ioward or his heirs, are given $2,000.00. 
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Given to Mrs. William Stewart in the instruments 
dated January 14, 1952, and May 7,1949. 
DIAMOND WATCH: 
Given to Gertrude (Petry) Lewis in the instrument 
dated June 3, 1940, and called a diamond and plati-
num watch. In 1939, Mrs. Gertrude (Petry) Lewis 
is given 3 j20ths of the remainder of the estate. 
Given to Mrs. Percy E. Radley in the instrument 
dated May 7, 1949. 
Given to Mildred Black in the instrument dated Jan-
uary 14, 1952. 
It will be noted that in the 1940 instrument, Mrs. 
Helen i\I. Duys is given a box of pictures and a large 
native rare basket in case, which were stored at Hagers 
Warehouse, and in the 19·39 instrument, a Mrs. Helen 
Howard Duys is given 3 j20ths of the remainder of the. es-
tate, and in 1949, she is given the old silver tea caddy. In 
1952, Mrs. Henry M. Duys is given the solitaire diamond 
pendant. And note the language of the 1952 instrument, 
where all of the personal effects go to Rosamond Lamb 
and Mary Stuart Tinling, subject to certain special be-
quests. 
In Sa,nford v. Vaughan1 1 Phillip Eccl. Rep. 39, 161 
Eng. Reprint 907, the court held that this denoted an in-
tention to substitute one will for the other, and held that 
by bequeathing the specific personal property differently 
in the second will, the testator had in effect, substituted 
the second will for the first and had impliedly revoked 
the first. 
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In the case of D-empsey v. Lawson, LR,. 2 Prob. Di\. 
98, the court held that a second will, repeating various 
bequeaths in the first will, and appointing the same exe-
cutor as in that document, revoked the first "rill, though 
it contained no residuary clause. 
In the instant ease, it was stipulated that ~Irs. Flor-
ence P. Howard, also known as Mrs. F. P. Howard, had 
the three former instruments with her at the time she 
wrote the fourth instrument, and in the case of Shiel v. 
0' Brien, IR. Rep. 7 Eq. 64, the Court held that if a person 
with an earlier will before him, executed a second "Till, 
complete in form, the intention of the testa tor was ob-
viously to revoke the first. 
It will be noted by an examination of the original 
instruments, (not the photostats), that the testatrix 
knew the difference between a codicil and a will, since she 
had written on the top of one page, "Codicil", although 
she had not written anything n1ore than that. She had 
also written at the top of the instrument dated June 3, 
1940, "appended to holographic will", and had used the 
phrase, "this is the last will of me, Florence P. Howard" 
in the will of January 14, 1952, as well as in a previous 
instrument, so that the instrument of January 14-, 1952 
is not a codicil and was not in tended to be such. It "Till 
be noted also, at the top of the page of that will, testatrix 
used the term "holographic will" and underlined the sante 
words. 
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In the case of In re Drake, 15 N.J. Misc. R. 44, 192 
.A... 428, the court held that the second will revoked the 
first, although the result was a partial intestacy, and 
stated: 
'"The t\vo wills are inconsistent because in the 
first will he disposed of all his property by will 
and made provisions for the contingency of his 
wife's pre-decease, while in the second will he did 
not provide for such contingency, but left the dis-
position in such case to the provisions of the laws 
of intestacy in force at his decease and the circum-
stances existing at that time. The result is not 
necessarily the 'Same and is not the same in this 
case, and in any case the two modes of disposi-
tion are legally different and p·ass a different 
estate." 
In the instrument of January 14, 1952, a bequest 
is 1nade to one Marie Petry of Port Hope, Ontario, and to 
Mrs. Peter Lewis of the same place, and a bequest is 
rnade to Mrs. Henry ~I. Duys and to Ernest Howard, the 
brother of Mrs. Henry M. Duys. In the instrument of 
May 7, 1949, a statement is made, "balance of estate after 
bequests, expenses have been paid to he divided as fol-
lows:" Thereafter, a certain percentage is given to Mrs. 
Helen Howard Duys, Ernest F'. Howard, Marie Petry 
and Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis. It is importap.t to know 
whether or not the Marie Petry mentioned in the instru-
Jnent of January 14, 1952 is the same as the ~1arie Petry 
.1nentioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether or not 
~Irs. Peter Lewis, mentioned in the January 14, 1952 in-
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strument is the same as Mrs. Gertrude Petry Le,vis Inen-
tioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether Mrs. Henry 
M. Duys is the same person as Mrs. Helen Howard Duys 
mentioned in the 1949 instrument, and whether Ernest 
Howard, mentioned in the January 14, 1952 instrun1ent, 
is the same person as Ernest F. Howard mentioned in the 
1949 instrument. If evidence had been allowed to be in-
troduced-, and the intervenors allowed in the case, this 
matter could have been developed, and if they were found 
to be the same persons, it would have great bearing on 
the intention of the testatrix in the January 14, 1952 
will, in this : That she did take care of those 'vhom she 
desired who were residuary legatees under the 1949 'Yill, 
and it clearly shows an intention to revoke the bequests 
giving certain property in the 1949 instrument, espe-
cially if we consider the language in the will, "balance 
of the estate after bequests, expenses have been paid to 
be divided as follows:" with the language in the 19[)2 
instrument, "if after taxes and estate expenses are paid, 
there is. a surplus of over $50,000.00; I wish the above 
cash (tax free) bequests to be doubled - including $50,-
000.00 to Rosamond Lamb, Montreal." 
In the 1952 will, Marie Petry is g1ven $5,000.00, 
which is to be doubled, if after taxes and estate expenses 
are paid, there is a surplus of over $50,000.00. In the 
san1e manner, Mrs. Peter Lewis is to get $3,000.00 to he 
doubled in the same manner. In the 1939 'vill, the balanee 
of the estate is to be divided as follows: 7 j20ths to ::\1 rs. 
H. J. H. Petry, and should she predecease the tPstatrix, 
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the above 7 j20ths to be divided as follows: 4j20ths to 
Marie Petry and 3j20ths to Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis; 
4j20ths to Thirs. Helen Duys, and 3j20ths to Ernest How-
ard, and evidence should have been adduced as to whether 
or not Thirs. H. J. H. Petry predeceased Mrs. Florence 
P. Howard, also knovvn as F. P. Howard. In the 1949 
will, the balance of the estate, after bequests and expenses 
have been paid, is to be divided as follows: 3j20ths to 
Mrs. Helen Howard Duys, 3j20ths to Ernest F. Howard, 
3j20ths to Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis and 3j20ths to 
Marie Petry. The change in the dispositive provisions 
for these persons appeared not only in the 1952 will, but 
there is a change between the 1939 and the 1949 instru-
ments. In the 1939 instrument, Marie Petry was to get 
4j20ths of the 7 j20ths, and Mrs. Gertrude Petry Lewis 
was to get 3 j20ths of the 7 j20ths. And in the 1949 will, 
Marie Petry was to get 3j20ths instead of 4j20ths. In 
the 1952 will she was to get $5,000.00 which is to be 
doubled under certain circumstances. If Mrs. Florence 
P. Howard, also known as F. P. Howard, did not intend 
by her vvill of 1952 t6 revoke the previous dispositive 
provisions in favor of Marie Petry and Mrs. Peter 
Lewis, who it appears may be the same person as Mrs. 
Gertrude Petry Lewis, she would not have asked that the 
bequests in their favor be doubled if there was a certain 
surplus. In other words, the doubling of the bequests in 
the 1952 will was intended to take care of the contingency 
of there being a surplus after the specific bequests, 
expenses of administration and taxes, rather than to 
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have the surplus distributed under the residuary pro-
visions of the 1949 will. To disregard this arrangen1ent 
would be to fly in the face of precedent and would result 
in the court writing a will for the testatrix contrary to 
her expressed intention. It would require a court to 
hold that although the testatrix, in the will of 1952, had 
especially provided for Marie Petry and Mrs. Gertrude 
Petry Lewis and Mrs. Henry M. Duys and Ernest 
Howard, and did not provide for the other residuary 
legatees mentioned in the 1939 or the 1949 wills, to-wit: 
Mrs. Gordon Burleigh and Mrs. Ethel Forrest and Ilenry 
Howard Petry, she did not so intend. It may be noted 
that thyre are seven persons na1ned as those to take the 
balance of the estate in the 1949 will, and six to take the 
balance in the 1939 will, if Mrs. H. J. H. Petry pre-
deceased the testatrix. One of the differences between 
the names of those to get the balance of the estate, 
between the 1939 and the 1949 will is Henry Howard 
Petry, who may or may not be the husband or son of 
Mrs. H. J. H. Petry. In any event, this points out 
further the· fact that the Motion to Intervene should 
have been granted and evidence taken on the contest. 
To give a construction that would require the holding 
that these dispositive provisions in the 1952 instru1nent 
are not so inconsistent with the 1949 and 1939 instru-
ments as to show an intention on the part of the testatrix 
to revoke the previous instruments, would result in a 
disregard of the testatrix's intention to revoke the pro-
visions as to the balance of the residuary legatees in the 
1949 will. 
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It 'viii be noted that Section 74-1-22, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides that a prior will is revoked 
by a subsequent will w·here the "later C'Ontains an express 
revocation or provisions wholly inconsistent with the 
terms of the former will * * *." This statute does not 
say that all of the provisions must be wholly inconsistent, 
or that the will must be wholly inconsistent, but that the 
later will contained "provisions" wholly inconsistent. 
It will be noted that the Executor in this ca:se, the 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, objected to the Motion 
of Appellants to intervene, although it was app·arent 
from the record that no notice of the hearing of 1\llay 
14, 1952, for the admission to probate of the instruments, 
was given either by mailing to the Appellants., or by 
publication or lawful posting. 
In view of Tiller, et al., vs. Norton, et al., a Utah 
case, decided February 20, 1953, found at 253 P. 2d 618, 
not yet reported in the Utah Reports, wherein the Trust 
Co1npany went to great effort to ascertain the heirs in 
above entitled _case, the executor here should have wel-
comed any action which would have determined the heirs 
and legatees. The Court stated in the case of Tiller vs. 
Norton: 
"Under the facts and the authorities, we can-
not say that the trial court erred in concluding 
there was no such fraud, although we are con-
strained to believe and to note that the probate 
well might have been deferred by the court a little 
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longer in this case in the hope that what happened 
would happen, * * * the appearance of the chil-
dren, who became the unwilling victims of a 
damnum absque injuria." 
And in the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe, 
reference is made to the case of Parker vs. Ross, (Utah); 
217 P. 2d 373. 
In the instant case, the executor, upon being apprised 
that there were heirs and that there was a question as 
to the disposition of the property, objects to the inter-
vention of such heirs and the taking of testimony ron-
cerning the dispositive provisions of the instrun1ents. 
In the case of McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 16!) A. 
24, an unattested will, informally drawn, was held to 
revoke a prior will, even though the unattested later 'vill 
was ineffective as to the charitable residuary bequest 
constituting its chief disposition. The court said: 
"Testatrix, in her second will, after providing 
for funeral expenses and the care of her lot, 
directs all her property to be reduced to cash, 
and gives it all to the 11 on1e for Protestant Chil-
dren. That is what she intended to do, and by so 
doing she completely annulled her pre-existing 
intention to give six bonds to the League of 
Women Voters. She disposes of 'everything else 
belonging to' her. There could be no clearer 
expression of intent than this provision. The mer,:~ 
fact that the 'vill did not earry \vith it a sufficient 
execution to 1nake the gift complete does not 
destroy the thought in the testatrix's n1ind \vhen 
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she wrote that paragraph, nor can we say that 
her intention was not complete because the will 
lacked t'vo signatures." 
An interesting discussion is found in 15 Iowa Law 
Review 232. 
In discussing Kearns vs. Roush, 146 S.E. 729 (W. 
\:a. 1929), the revie'v says : 
"
4The expression is often used that a subse-
quent will only revokes the former insofar as the 
t\vo are so inconsistent that they cannot stand 
together. 1 Williams, Executors (7th Am. Ed.) 
212. As a general rule, this may he true; but the 
statement is frequently made where there is no 
necessity for language of such a sweeping nature. 
In re Venables Will, 127 N.C. 344, 37 S.E. 465 
(1900), Williams vs. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 
705 (1903), Sampson vs. Foxon (1907) Prob. 34. 
There is a noticeable tendency of the courts to 
harmonize, if at all possible, the conflicting instru-
ments. Foy vs. F'oy, 125 Iowa 424, 101 N.W. 144 
(1904). This is prompted by an abhorrence of a 
partial intestacy. Great inconvenience is occa-
sioned when a portion of the property p~asses by 
the laws of testate succession and the remainder 
by the distinctly different laws .of intestacy. In 
re Marx Estate, 174 Cal. 762, 164 ·P. 640 (1917), 
Goods of Hartley, 50 L.J.P.D. 1 (1880). Perhaps 
too great an e1nphasis is placed upon the pre-
sumption against p·artial intestacy which orig~ 
inated at an early period when religious custom 
was a forceful inducement to make a will, but 
today no ·such reason exists. With the adequate 
provision for the disposition of intestate property 
at the present time it might well seem that since 
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the reason for the presumption no longer exists, 
it should be abolished. More consideration should 
be given to the true intention of the testator, by 
this, we mean his desire with respect to the 
apportionment of the property, rather than to the 
forn1 of the will or the n1echanics of disposition 
Dempsey vs. Lawson, 2 P.D. 98 (1877). If the 
intention of the testator is to be given paramount 
consideration it might logically follow that, "~hen 
the terms of the subsequent will clearly sho\\· a 
desire to depart fro1n the terms of the forn1e1 
doclunent, the first will should be revoked in its 
entirety despite the fact that a partial intestac) 
might result. Plenty vs. West, 9 Jur. 458 (1845)) 
Dempsey vs. Lawson, supra. If the general rule 
that the first will is revoked by the second onl~ 
insofar as it is inconsistent, "·ere strictly follo\ved 
it would seem that· where no executor \vas ap· 
pointed by the latter will, the executor nan1ed in 
the first should be carried over, but that was not 
the result. To justify this departure fro1n logic 
two solutions may be advanced. The first requires 
a distinction between the executor and the bene· 
ficiary and treats the former as an exception to 
the rule and is. in a category by himself. l\Ians 
courts have recognized the difference between 
executor and beneficiary, but have dismissed the 
matter in a perfunctory 1nanner without atten1pt. 
ing to establish a legal distinction. In re Gen· 
sinore's Est., 246 Pa. 216, 92 Atl. 134 (1914), in 
re Iburg's Estate, 196 Colo. 333, 238 Pae. 74 
(1925). The differences are readily apparent. 
The interest of the executor is earned while thai 
of the beneficiary is in the nature of a gift. The 
executor is an officer of the court \Vhich further 
distinguishes hiin fron1 the beneficiary. .At an 
early stage of the la\\'" the appoinbnent of an 
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executor is not required. Even though these are 
1narked differences, it n1ay be questioned if they 
\Yould ""'arrant the application of distinctly dif-
ferent rules. The other view is of a more liberal 
nature, and would disregard the distinction be-
t,veen executor and beneficiary. If this stand is 
taken the principal case might be considered as 
an extension of the doctrine of revocation by 
implication." 
It \vill be noted, that of the seven residuary legatees 
n1entioned in the 1949 docm11ent, several of them have 
specific bequests in the 1952 document and several others, 
under slightly different na1nes have also such specific 
bequests, for example: The 1949 will makes Marie Petry 
a residuary legatee, and· the 1952 will makes a specific 
bequest to Marie Petry. The 1949 will makes Ern·est 
Howard one of the residuary legatees and the 1952 will -
Inakes a specific bequest to Ernest Howard. The 1949 
will makes Mrs. Helen Howard Duys a residuary legatee, 
and the 1952 will makes a specific bequest to Mrs. Henry 
M. Duys. The 1949 will makes Mrs.. Gertrude Petry 
Lewis one of the residuary legatee_s and the 1952 will 
makes a specific bequest to Mrs. Peter Lewis of the same 
address. If these latter four people, are not the same two 
under different names, the 1952 will has specifically taken 
care of four of her residuary legatees., and such fact is 
confir1natory of her intent that the 1952 will he her sole 
existing testament at the time of her death. The lower 
Court should at least have taken evidence to establish 
whether these people are the same or are four different 
people. 
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POINT NO. V. 
SINCE THE PROPOSED INTERVENORS WERE DE-
NIED INTERVENTION, THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
MADE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT AS 
THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN GRANTED A TRIAL AND 
WERE PARTIES, AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED 
TO BIND THEM BY SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE, AS SIGNED IN THE 
PURPORTED WILL CONTEST. 
It will be noted that after the Inter1nediate Appeal 
had been granted by this Honorable Court, one of the 
Attorneys for Respondents, prepared and had signed by 
the Court, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La"r 
and Decree, atte1npting to bind Appellants in the pur-
ported Will Contest. 
In 1 Freeman on Judgntents, page 899, it states: 
"Thus one who merely enters an appearance 
for the purpose of intervention, but withdra\v~ 
before filing a petition, does not become a party, 
so as to be hound by the subsequent judgment, 
and the same is true of one whose petition has 
been dismissed, or whose attempt to intervene 
is defeated by the adverse party, or whose claim 
has been withdrawn before judgment." 
It will be noted that Appellants' atteu1pt to inter-
vene was defeated by the adverse parties, anrl Appellants 
not only should not be bound, but no reference should 
be made to them in the Findings and Conclusions and 
particularly in the introductor~r part, where it statP~ 
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that the .. A .. ppellants vvere present and appeared by coun-
sel, which is not legally true, as is shown by the Court's 
Order, denying-leave to intervene. 
30 .LJm. Jttr., page 951, Section 220 states: 
Strangers to Judgment.-"It is well settled 
that, with certain exceptions hereinafter noted, 
the doctrine res judicata does not operate to affect 
strangers to a judgment, that is, to affect the 
rights of those who are neither parties nor in 
privity with a party therein. The judgment is 
not available as an adjudication either against 
or in favor of such other persons, whether it is 
attempted to be used in connection with the cause 
of action previously litigated, or in connection 
with particular issues determined therein. A 
party to the principal. case is regarded as a 
stranger to the judgment rendered in the previous 
action where he was not directly interested in 
the subject matter thereof, and had no right to 
make defense, adduce testimony, cross-examine 
witnesses, control the proceedings, or appeal from 
the judgment, even though he could have made 
himself a party to the previous action. The right 
to intervene in an action does not, in the absence 
of its exercise, subject one possessing it to the 
risk of being hound by the result of the litigation, 
under the doctrine of res judicata." 
31 Ant. Jur., page 7 4, Section 411, state-s: 
Opportunity to he heard.-"It is a funda-
mental doctrine of the law that a party to be 
affected by a personal judgment must have a day 
in court, or an opp-ortunity to be heard. In this 
connection, it is sometimes declared broadly that 
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every man is entitled to an opportunity to be 
heard in a court of laV\r upon every question in-
volving his rights or interests, before he is affect-
ed by any judicial decision on the question. The 
judgment of a court without hearing the party 
or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not 
a judicial determination of his rights, and is not 
entitled to respect in any other tribunal." 
It will be observed that in the instant case, Appel-
lants atten1pted to intervene, but were denied the right, 
and are in at least as good a position as a person "·ho 
had the right to intervene but did not exercise it. 
We further submit, no attempt should be made to 
bind the Appellants without granting then1 their "day 
in court" and to permit theln to introduce testiinony 
in support of their position. 
In the case of Rogers vs. Trans American Corpora-
tion (Calif.), 44 P. 2d 635; it was stated: 
"When a party is dismissed fro1n an action 
he becomes a stranger thereto, and no judg1nent 
or order can be rendered against hun therein until 
the dismissal is vacated.'' 
To paraphrase the above words slightly, and to carry 
the theory over, we would like to sub1nit the true rule i~: 
When a party attempts to intervene in an 
action and h·e is denied such right, he re1nains 
a stranger thereto, and no judginent or order 
can be rendered against hin1 therein, until the 
denial of intervention is vaeated. 
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It is submitted that pending determination of this 
Intermediate Appeal, an Order of the s,upreme Court 
should issue directing the lower Court to withdraw an.d 
rescind its said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted : 
That the Order admitting the wills to p.robate was 
not a valid order, because the Court had no jurisdiction 
of the matter, and therefore, the six-months time for 
filing a Contest, provided by statute, could not commence 
to run until there was a valid order. 
That the Motion to Intervene should have been 
granted. 
That since the Court did not allow the Ap~p,ellants 
to intervene, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree in the matter of the Contest, should 
be set aside as not binding upon the Ap·pellants. 
That the Court order that the costs of Appellants on 
this appeal be paid out of the assets. of the estate. Sec. 
75-14-21, U.C.A. 1953. 
R·espectfully submitted, 
H. F. LAZIER of LAZIER & LAZIER, 
JOHN D. RICE, JAMES E. FAUST, J. 
LAMBERT GIBSON, and CLEON B. 
F·EIGHT, 
Attorneys for Petitioners in Interven-
tion and A.ppellwnts. 
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